What is physicalism?
The belief that everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes properties, events, objects, and any substance(s) that exist).
What does supervenience mean?
Supervenience is one way dependence and is commonly explained as follows;
x depends on y but not vice versa
x supervened on y, if x depends entirely on y
so there’s no change in x possible without a change in y
What is the difference between local and global supervenience?
Local supervenience argues that the mind is dependent on the brain alone
Global supervenience argues that the mind supervenes of the entire universe, this leads to pan-psychism
What does physicalism say about mental properties?
Either mental properties (and the mind) are physical or they supervene upon the physical body
Define Hard behaviourism
All propositions about mental states can be reduced, without loss of meaning, to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements.
Define Soft behaviourism
Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (i.e. propositions that use ordinary language).
What does it mean to say analytical reduction?
Analytical claims are claims about the meanings of words or concepts
Analytic reductions are concerned with the meaning of terms
An analytic reduction occurs when one shows that the meaning of talk about something is equivalent to the meaning of talk about another thing
This reduction occurs through analysis of language alone without investigation into how the world really is
What are the issues with dualism?
The problem of interaction
behaviourism denies that the mind and body are separate so there is no interaction issue
Proper analysis of our talk of minds will show that it concerns observable physical behaviour so there is no observable immaterial substance in causal interaction with the body
The problem of other minds
Minds are not private or non-physical and so their existence can be verified empirically (through observing behaviours)
So solipsism isn’t an issue
What is a category mistake?
The error of assigning to something a quality or an action which can only properly be assigned to things of another category.
Ryle uses the example of Imagine a person being shown around a university. After they had been shown the various buildings, they then asked ‘but where is the university?’ They had made a categorical error thinking the university belonged to the category of ‘building’, rather than in the category of ‘a collection of buildings’
How does the category mistake apply to dualism?
Ryle argues that Descartes makes a category mistake in assuming that the mind is a non-physical thing:
Just because the mind is not a physical thing, that doesn’t mean it must be a non-physical thing.
Instead the mind might not be a ‘thing’ at all
Ryle argues that the language we use to describe the mind confuses us about the logical category it belongs to:
The terms ‘state’ and ‘process’ appear to relate only to physical things
Yet we refer to mental states and processes
This leads us to think that the mind must also be a ‘thing’
Descartes is unable to find this physical ‘thing’ so concludes that the mind must be non-physical, based on the incorrect assumption that the mind is some type of ‘thing’
What does Ryle say about Descartes theory>
He suggests Descartes is arguing for the dogma of the ghost in the machine
What does Ryle conclude from his category mistake criticism?
that the term ‘mind’ simply refers to a set of behavioural dispositions
For example if we describe someone as scared, we aren't describing their mental state but their inclination/disposition to make scared facial expressions and run away
Saying “he felt angry” = saying “he exhibited certain behaviours such as reddening, clenching his fists and shouting”
Ryle illustrates this further with an analogy of the brittle nature of glass
‘Brittleness’ is not a physical thing yet we don’t conclude that it must be a non-physical thing
Instead we agree that ‘brittleness’ simply refers to the tendency/disposition of glass to shatter upon impact
Brittleness refers to the behavioural dispositions of glass
Likewise, the ‘mind’ refers to a set of human behavioural dispositions
Ryle’s claim that the mind should be seen in the category ‘behaviours’ rather than the category ‘substance’ is the claim made by behaviourism
What is important to notice about Ryle’s criticism of dualism?
He doesn’t prove Descartes wrong, he simply explains that if Descartes is wrong then it’s because of his category mistake.
Meaning Ryle’s argument is an If… then… argument
What is the verification principle?
A statement has meaning if it can be verified empirically or analytically
How are analytic statements true of false?
Virtue of their meaning
How are synthetic statements true of false?
Virtue of the way the world is
What is the verification condition?
The set of conditions which make the statement true
What does the verification principle say about statements about the mind?
That statements about the mind are meaningless unless verifiable
In dualism, you can’t verify mental statements analytically nor empirically as they are private
So they are meaningless
This is counterintuitive as we obviously can talk meaningfully about other people’s minds
What is the problem with the verification principle?
The verification principle cannot be verified analytically or empirically. It is therefore meaningless by its own standards.
Response to the problem with the verification principle
The verification principle is a tautology
It can also be reworded as a definition (so we can’t treat it in the same way as we treat other propositions) as it would be self defining/a tautology/verifiable analytically
Explain the private language argument from Wittgenstein
Assuming that mental states are private, they are meaningless
Mental states are not meaningless and so there must be a way to verify them and they must thus not be private (instead they’re observable behaviours)
For a word to be meaningful there must be rules determining its use which you can use to tell if the word is being used correctly
E.g. describing a cat as a dog is wrong
If mental states are private and subjective then there could be no such rules for them making them meaningless
e.g. if pain is private there is no rule for when it can be used and so its meaningless
But the term pain isn't meaningless
Therefore mental states must be publicly observable and empirically verifiable since mental language clearly cannot be meaningless
So Behaviourists say that mental states are behaviour
According to Hempel, what is it that we are actually talking about when we talk about the mind and mental states?
Behaviour
What are behaviours in hard behaviourism?
All physical events that can (in principle) be empirically observed
Includes those physical events which can only be observed using apparatus
These are expressed in purely the language of physics
These are actions because the person does it, e.g. crying, swearing
How does Hempel distinguish between actions and behaviours?
Action = An event performed by an agent guided by the intention of the agent
Behaviour = A purely physical event, described in the language of physics
How can the mental state (anger) be expressed as an action and then as behaviours?
‘Anger’ goes to ‘Clenching fists’ (action) goes to ‘Finger muscles contracting etc’ (behaviours)
What does Hempel refer to actions and mental states as?
Physicalist statements
What does Hemepl refer to behaviours as?
Statements of physics
Define behavioural disposition
A proneness or a potential to behave in a certain way (in neutral circumstances)
How can behavioural dispositions be expressed?
In terms of hypothetical propositions
How does the translation of mental states differ in SB compared to HB?
Ryle thinks mental statements can be translated into ordinary language (whilst Hempel says it can only be translated into physical language)
Soft behaviourism speaks of analysing in terms of compared to fully translating mental states (as physical behaviourism does)
Explain the criticism that is ‘Can there be a full translation without loss of meaning/collapses into MBTIT’?
A full translation without loss of meaning appears impossible as particular mental states may be realised by different behaviours.
Can there really be a full translation into physical behaviour?
how do you convey intention - doing something accidentally vs doing something intentionally
For example, the action ‘Nathan kicks a ball’ can be translated as ‘the muscles of Nathan’s leg contracts and then relaxes with the result that the foot comes into contact with the ball and propels it through the air ‘
But the description could equally mean ‘Nathans leg cramped and he accidentally kicked the ball’ so there is a loss of meaning - nathan's intention
However, if you actually did describe everything up to the minute physical level - tracking the eye, neurons firing etc, then there would be a clear difference between accidentally and purposefully kicking something
If the behaviours are in fact the same, then surely the actions are also the same
But is neural activity actually behaviours? He appears to have strayed into mind-brain identity theory (so faces the same issues)
How does soft behaviourism avoid the criticism of ‘can there be a full translation/collape into MBTIT’?
Soft behaviourism speaks of analysing in terms of compared to fully translating mental states (as physical behaviourism does)
Soft behaviourism allows that there is a loss of meaning
It also allows for a common-sense view of behaviours
They are observable with the naked eye
Explain Hempel’s perfect actor criticism
‘The further objection will perhaps be raised that men can feign. Thus, though a criminal at the bar may show physical symptoms of mental disorder, one would nevertheless be justified in wondering whether his mental confusion was ‘real’ or only simulated’ (Hempel)
Example:
Imagine a person on trial for a murder of which they are clearly guilty.
If the person has a mental disorder, their sentence will be significantly less harsh than if they are clear headed.
The problem is, the person has no mental disorder.
Nonetheless, they want to reduce their sentence, so they feign the symptoms of schizophrenia.
This person happens to be a perfect actor (they are able to feign ALL the physical behaviours associated with schizophrenia)
If hard behaviourism is true, then the perfect actor, as long as they perfectly replicate the behaviours of remorse, is surely remorseful.
This, intuitively, seems untrue, even nonsensical
Explain Hempel’s response to the perfect actor criticism
As far as a normal human observer can tell, there may be no observable difference between the remorseful person, and the perfect actor feigning remorse
However a ‘more penetrating examination’, observing everything that is in principle observable would reveal whether the person was feigning sadness or actually sad, since even someone with a gift for acting cannot fake such behaviours.
Such an examination would involve looking at processes in the nervous system, or other physiological symptoms, rather than merely voluntary actions.
Explain the criticism of Hempel’s response to the perfect actor criticism
He collapses into MBTIT
Explain how soft behaviourism avoids the perfect actor criticism
Someone feigning schizophrenia is disposed to not say they hear voices under neutral circumstances (regardless of whether they do so)
So you can’t say they are schizophrenic
Explain the criticism that mental states are multiply realisable in behaviour
To say that someone holds a certain mental state eg. anger can mean an infinite number of different things (the list of verification conditions is infinitely long).
An angry person can be jumping up and down or sitting stock still, talking non-stop or utterly silent, hitting others or hitting themself, screaming or being passive aggressive
In fact, anger can express itself in all behaviour
Therefore, how can behaviour capture the meaning of a mental state, since the verification conditions would look the same for anger as for happiness (ie. would contain all behaviours)
The verification of happiness and anger could be identical - e.g. smiling/laughing angrily
This is problematic as hard behaviourism relies on the verification principle
You also can't say that two people are experiencing the same feelings if they are displaying different behaviours
Plus Hempel’s full translation would need to include all the possible ways mental states can be manifested in behaviour
As the list is indefinite this is impossible
So behaviourism can't complete its aim to analyse mental states into exclusively physical behavioural ones
Explain how soft behaviourism overcomes the criticism of mental states are multiply realisable in behaviour
Dispositions are not infinite and so you can distinguish between mental states.
Explain the circularity criticism of behaviourism
There is no way of analysing a mental state purely referencing behaviour
One cannot conclude that i am thirsty (mental state) purely from watching me drink something (behaviour)
I could instead believe the drink is poisoned (mental state) and feel suicidal (mental state) hence why i drink the drink
But you could not have inferred my suicidal mental state purely from my behaviours (drinking the drink)
It is only explained through reference to my belief that the drink is poisoned (mental state)
So you can only explain/infer mental states through reference to other mental states - this is circular
So behavioural analysis can’t be completed and behaviourism fails
PLUS it’s clear that mental states cannot be analysed fully in terms of the language of physics
Explain how soft behaviourism overcomes the circularity criticism of hard behaviourism
soft behaviourism allows for the use of ‘ordinary language’ so the circularity criticism is not an issue
Explain the criticism of behaviourism that says it can’t account for thinking, and the responses
They don’t account for thinking
E.g. daydreaming about the sea - no observable behaviours, arguably no behavioural dispositions
Response:
Thinking isn't always private and internal
E.g. thinking through a sum on paper
Thinking out loud
Thinking through motions
But this still doesn’t account for daydreaming/actually private and internal thinking
Explain Putnam’s super Spartans criticism of behaviourism
Hilary putnam asks us to imagine a super-spartans
Trained not only to suppress their pain behaviour but to suppress their disposition towards pain behaviour
What happens when one steps on a nail? Do they not feel pain?
A soft behaviourist (and hard behaviourist) would say no
Putnam thinks this is ridiculous
But this bding counterintuitive doesn't mean it isn't true
Since the idea of Super-Spartans is not contradictory it would seem that our concept of pain cannot be reduced to behavioural concepts.
Putnam concludes that pain behaviour is a symptom of being in pain rather than constitutive of it
Explain the response to the super spartan criticism
Behavioural dispositions are inclinations to behaviours in neutral circumstances
If they hadn't been trained (if they were in neutral circumstances) they would be disposed to show pain
So they still experience pain (more intuitive)
But given their training do they still have the disposition to show pain?
e.g. if you chemically altered a substance so that it can’t dissolve in water, is it still soluble because without the alteration it would dissolve?
Explain the evidence of introspection as a criticism of behaviourism
Dualists will urge that I am aware from my own experience that mental states have a subjective and private dimension.
The experiences of qualia, in particular, have a specific quality which I am directly acquainted with.
This subjective quality is not something that can be rendered in terms of behaviour.
Any description of my behaviour cannot include what it is like for me to experience a toothache, for example.
So while behaviourism might seem plausible as an account of how we ascribe mental states to others, it cannot do justice to the lived experience of mental life as it is experienced from the subjective point of view.
Explain the response to the criticism using evidence of introspection
Introspection is not necessarily infallible, the physicalist would simply say we are mistaken as non-physical qualia cannot actually exist.
Explain the Asymmetry criticism of behaviourism
There is an important difference between the way I come to know about my own mental states as opposed to the mental states of others. - a simple flaw of behaviourism
To determine what mental state someone else is in I only have their behaviour to go on.
e.g. I assume Jess is hungry because I hear her stomach growling
However, to discover what mental state I am in I have no need of behavioural evidence.
If I am hungry, I can tell because I am directly acquainted with the sensation of hunger
I don’t need to listen to my stomach to realise I’m hungry
Behaviourism is unable to explain this asymmetry.
It suggests that knowledge of my own mental states is arrived at in the same way as is knowledge of others' mental states, by observation of my behaviour.
The fact that I don't need to observe my behaviour in order to know what mental state I am suggests that mental states are not equivalent to behaviours
This shows that behaviourism is false.
Explain Ryle’s response to the asymmetry objection
Ryle claims that we still realise our mental states through ‘paying attention’ to our own ‘silent behaviours’, as we do to the outer behaviours of others
So there is no real difference between our experience of our own mental states and our experience of other people’s mental states
We just have privileged access to our ‘inner behaviours’
Explain the criticism of Ryle’s response to the asymmetry objection
What are inner behaviours?
But if they refer to processes in the nervous system, or other physiological symptoms then the theory appears to collapse into MBTIT
If they don’t refer to these processes, Ryle appears to be speaking of the dualist idea of private experience, straying from behaviourism
Explain the criticism of behaviourism that says mental states cause behaviour using Ockham’s razor
Everyday experience suggests that our mental states have a causal influence on our behaviour.
e.g. if I am in pain I normally assume that this pain is part of what causes me to cry
But the behavioural analysis says that the desire is to be analysed in terms of my behaviour.
So the pain is the act of crying (among other things) not what causes the crying
This is counter-intuitive
Plus the common-sense approach provides an explanation of our behaviour.
I cry because I am in pain
Behaviourism has no explanation of this sort to offer
If mental states are just behaviour and dispositions to behave, then we cannot explain why we act as we do.
Explain the response to the criticism of behaviourism that says mental states cause behaviour using Ockham’s razor
The fact that behaviourism is in conflict with common sense doesn't show that it is false.
Common sense may be wrong.
Explain the criticism of the response to the criticism of behaviourism that says mental states cause behaviour using Ockham’s razor
It is reasonable to accept this common -sense approach given that the arguments of behaviourists are shit (as above)
Ockham’s razor
So, given the advantages of our everyday view of these matters over the behaviourist's revised account, it is reasonable to stick to the common- sense picture.