Meta-ethics

1. Reason

2. Emotions/ attitudes

3. Society

1. Mind to world

2. World to mind

Mind to world= we change our beliefs to fit the world e.g. I believe a perfect house needs 4 bathrooms. I live in a 3 bathroom house and change my belief- world is changing us

World to mind= we are changing the world based on our desires, we have things we want in the world e.g. I am hungry so I am going to change the world by using ingredients to make a cake

moral statements don’t fit into either direction of fit

moral judgments are propositions which can be known- can be proven true or false- about language

moral judgments cannot be known, they do not say anything true or false- about language

emotivism

there are ‘real’ moral properties or ‘real’ moral facts which exist independently of human minds- refers to world

argue no moral properties exist and moral terms refer to something else- refers to world

type of moral realism, arguing that moral properties/ facts are natural properties of the world- leads to a cognitivist view of moral language

utilitarianism

Bentham argues all humans aim to secure pleasure to avoid pain- these are psychological and hence natural properties and draws conclusion ‘we ought to maximise pleasure and minimise pain’

1. ‘the good’ is the thing humans value most, strive for eudaimonia- natural fact about human behaviour

2. to live a ‘good’ life and be a good human you need to fulfill your function well- our function is a natural fact about us guided by reason

1. The naturalistic fallacy

2. The open Question argument

3. Hume’s Is-Ought Fallacy

claim that there are moral properties/ facts in the world yet these are not natural properties- they are special non- natural properties

cognitivist

intuitionism

Moore

Moore argues moral truths such as ‘killing is wrong’ are grasped in self evident intuitions

goodness is like the colour yellow- cannot be defined, just intuited

complex= horse- can be broken down further e.g. animal, mammal, equine

simple= yellow- can’t be broken down further

simple- cannot be broken down further

elevator example:

Think of the maximum capacity sign in an elevator, what can I know about that elevator given the sign ?

1. Size (x people)

2. Material (enough to hold x kilograms)

   In order for us to make synthetic observations about the elevator, there must be some a priori preconditions about space and time to make that possible

ethical judgments are unique and cannot be analysed in non-moral or natural terms

1. Open question argument

2. naturalistic fallacy

1. closed questions= is pleasure pleasure ?

2. open question= is pleasure good?

3. Utilitarianism= good= pleasure but the fact that we can debate ‘is pleasure really good’ shows these terms don’t mean the same thing

4. Kant- duty= pleasure, but the fact that i can ask ‘is doing your duty really good?’ shows that duty and good have different meanings

5. Therefore these open questions prove fallacious as we can’t define good with a natural property

1. good= indefinable

2. A term that is indefinable cannot be defined, any attempt to= fallacious

3. for example yellow cannot be defined

4. defining “good”in naturalistic terms= commiting naturalistic fallacy

5. Mills proof (utilitarianism) defines “good” as “desired”- according to Moore Mill is commiting naturalistic fallacy

Mary Warnock believed Moore interpreted Mill’s intentions incorrectly, Mill was creating an empirical argument making the factual point that people pursue happiness as a worthwhile goal

1. Hume’s fork

2. Ayer’s verification principle

3. moral judgments do not equal beliefs/ reason

4. Hume’s Is- Ought gap

5. Mackie’s relativity

6. Mackie’s queerness

1. Relations of ideas

2. Matters of fact

analytic, a priori e.g. All bachelors are unmarried men, 3+4=7

synthetic, a posteriori e.g. Barack Obama was a US president, Water can turn into ice

moral realism is cognitivist, hume’s fork gives us 2 ways to achieve true/ false- moral judgments do not fit into the fork

Vienna circle

logical positivist, part of Vienna circle

adopted scientific approach to philosophy, aiming to define what is meaningful

Hume was concerned with knowledge, Ayer was focused on meaning

1. It is a tautology

2. It is verifiable through sense experience

something that is true by definition, cannot be contradicted

all red parrots are red

all moral judgements fail the principle- e.g. murder is wrong, is not true by definition, ‘murder’ just means killing- in some situations murder may be acceptable

fails its own criteria, neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable

belief and reason don’t motivate us, unlike what Kant suggests

stealing example: I reason that stealing is wrong, however if close to starving, my desire and emotion overcomes any reason. Or I steal to impress a friend

marmite example: I believe we have a jar of marmite at home in the cupboard. When I get home I see this belief is true. This belief alone does not motivate me to eat marmite- there would need to be a desire or emotion such as hunger to motivate me

If Hume is right moral judgements have their source inside us- emotion and desire and so moral judgments do not represent something independent to us- don’t refer to external moral properties or facts

you cannot take facts about a subject (is statements) and derive moral judgments from them ( ought statements)

It is bed time you ought to brush your teeth

John Searle

P= You promised to pay me back my £5

C= You ought to pay me back

There is a hidden evaluative premise- within the word promise comes the moral obligation of keeping a promise

that morality is not objective, it is subjective and moral realism is incorrect as there are no moral properties or facts that exist mind- independently of us

P1: there are differences in moral codes from society to society

P2: there are disagreements between moral codes

P3: Disagreements occur because:

a) there is an objective truth but people’s perceptions are distorted

b) there is no objective truth about the matter

P4: moral disagreements occur because

a) there are objective moral values, but people’s perception of them are distorted

b) there are no objective moral values, simply reflections and different ways of living

C: The best explanation of moral disagreements is that there are no objective moral values

Papua new Guinea grand valley

• Mackie predicts his own criticism

• there are some moral values like ‘treat others as you wish to be treated’, present within all societies

• Mackie points out we also share basic fanatical idea- liberal freedom, religious intolerance

• Do these values express objective truth- No

• like moral values, they hold emotional weight which makes them seem truthful but they are not

argument from queerness

1. Metaphysical strangeness

2. Epistemological strangeness

morals have strange way of motivating us ‘moral internalism’- there must be some type of external ‘good’ that can generate motivation yet for Mackie this is illogical to suggest - nothing in the world that motivates us as much as morals

God is the ‘external’ good that motivates us- Divine Command theory

the moral realist must be committed to believing that we have a mysterious faculty which enables us to detect these moral properties, a ‘strange moral sense’ in which nobody can point to or explain

there are no objective moral properties, and so no need for any special faculty or response

1. emotivism

2. Hare’s prescriptivism

3. error theory

moral judgments are beliefs that are intended to be true or false (cognitivism) yet moral properties do not exist (anti-realism) and so all these moral judgements are false

argument about what objects do or don’t exist in the world yet his conclusion is there are no moral properties based on his arguments from relativity and queerness

all our ethical judgments include a claim to objectivity which is an error arising from the way in which we are brought up in society as we ‘objectify ‘ social arrangements that we’ve learnt into moral codes

‘murder is wrong’ expresses a cognitive belief that murder is wrong- but ‘wrong’ refers to a non-existent property and so the statement is false

non-cognitivist and anti- realist about moral language

according to his verification principle, moral judgments are only expressions of emotion, talk of morals are meaningless just as talk of cake, not rational and aim to influence

like Ayer, non-cognitivist and anti-realist

• moral statements aim to guide

• moral judgments are prescriptive

• moral judgements contain universal prescriptions, when I declare “lying is wrong” I want this to be applied universally

• moral judgements and discussion are rational- we can use facts to support prescriptions

1. can moral realism account for how we use moral language

2. problem of accounting for moral progress

3. does anti-realism become moral nihilism

1. moral reasoning

2. commanding and guiding

3. persuading and influencing

4. disagreeing and agreeing

because there are moral facts about which we are disagreeing or reasoning or drawing on decisions or influence behaviour

anti- realists struggle to account for these uses

moral reasoning- partly

commanding and guiding- no moral judgments are expression of emotion

persuading and influencing- yes

Disagreeing and agreeing- no

moral reasoning- yes

commanding and guiding- yes

persuading and influencing- partly- change behaviours via prescription

disagreeing and agreeing- no

prescriptivism

Warnock

• we often compare our moral code with that of our ancestors and judge harshly

• looking back they had a ‘moral blind spot’

• hard not to draw the conclusion that our moral codes have gotten better and there has been genuine moral progress

we can talk about change in moral codes but cannot speak about moral progress as there is no objective moral standard as they reject mind-independent moral properties

Prescriptivist: universalising moral judgments, yielding new facts to be considered in moral judgments

Emotivism: ‘moral progress’ means we feel more approval for our own moral code

rejection of a particular set of beliefs, morality and its values

argue there are no moral facts or truths and moral knowledge is not possible

nihilists conclude that if there are no objective values, then morality as a whole is without foundation and we should abandon ethical practices living free from moral codes

Sartre

P1: there are no objective, moral independent facts or properties (anti-realism)

P2: If there are no objective moral facts then there is nothing that is morally wrong

C: If there is nothing morally wrong then we can do anything we like (moral nihilism)

moral anti-realists would reject the claim their position leads to nihilism- both would argue nihilism is logically inconsistent with their theory- premise 2