Philosophy Midterm

An argument is meant to convince one to believe or do something; it provides reasons in support of the belief or action.

A reason in support of the belief or action.

The argument the author wants the reader to believe or do, supported by reasons.

Extracting arguments from texts or speech; representing an argument into standard form.

Structured form of an argument; includes numbered premises and a conclusion.

Reason to support the conclusion. Can be either assumptions or inferences.

The premise is not supported within the argument itself.

The premise or conclusion is derived from other premises.

Interpret a text in the best way possible and make its argument as convincing as possible, even if you don't agree.

Figuring out how the argument is intended to work before determining whether it does work; determining whether an argument is TP or NTP.

The conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true. Called "deductions" and exhibit rational necessity.

A good NTP argument provides good reasons to accept the conclusion, but the conclusion could nevertheless be false. The best we can say is that NTP arguments exhibit rational probability—the premises make the conclusion probably true.

TP arguments form chains of reasons that lead inexorably to the truth of the conclusion; NTP arguments gather heaps of reasons that weigh in favor of the conclusion, but do not require its truth.

The argument has the right form: it's a chain of reasons leading inexorably to the conclusion.

If A Then B.

If A Then B.

The argument is valid, and its premises are true.

Strength comes in degrees. If an argument is strong ("statistically significant"), the heaps are weighty enough to make it irrational to reject the conclusion.

An argument is cogent if the argument is strong and all of its premises are true.

A NTP argument with independent premises all supporting a single conclusion. Strength is the weight of reasons in favor of the conclusion.

A comparison of two or more things; premises are shared characteristic(s). Strength is the degree of resemblance.

Premises present the evidence; conclusion explains the evidence. Strength is how well the conclusion explains the evidence.

A fallacy is an argumentative misstep—a wrong move that renders the argument unconvincing.

Three ways an argument can go wrong: 1. It is an attempted TP argument that is invalid. 2. It is an attempted NTP argument that is weak. 3. It depends on a false (or unacceptable) premise.

Occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it.

1. Framing Question ("What is X?") 2. Interlocutor proposes answer 3. Socrates refutes the answer (elenchus) 4. Interlocuter proposes refinement 5. Repeat 3 & 4 6. State of irresolution/puzzlement (aporia)

If 'pious' and 'god-loved' are different, then what is the relationship between them? Either (A) god-loved because pious, or (B) pious because god-loved. (A) is circular and (B) is arbitrary.

Pious is what is: (Genus) Just, and (Differentia) Concerned with care of the gods. Another differential definition: (Genus) Knowledge, and (Differentia) How to pray and sacrifice.

Says what a thing is, if you have it (necessary conditions); tells you how to find a thing, if you do not have it (sufficient conditions).

Generating a good definition.

Says what a thing is, if you have it. "If X, then C."

Tells you how to find a thing, if you do not have it. "If C, then X."

A proposed set of conditions.

Theory T is sufficient for X. Theory T is necessary for X. A good definition of X is a necessary and sufficient theory for X.

Can show either a condition is not necessary (X and not T) or not sufficient (T and not X).

Make T less restrictive by deleting conditions or make T more restrictive by adding conditions.

We need a set of conditions that must be met in order for something to count as one and the same person over time: a definition of "the same person." Moral responsibility makes this important.

Numerical: X and Y are only one thing. Qualitative: X and Y have common properties.

Person: a self. Human being: an organism (with mind/soul and body).

One person and not one soul (Soul Flow). One soul and not one person (Castor and Pollux; Nestor).

One person and not one soul.

One soul and not one person (there's two).

One soul and not one person (Nestor's spirit in Taylor's body).

Against body theory. Two persons, one body; one person, two bodies.

Chains of memory makes a consciousness continuous.

"It is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done."

In permanent amnesia, there will be two persons (but only one "man").

The drunk man is not the same person as the sober man (but it is not a good excuse for humans).

The body is how we identify the self and others. We care where the body goes. Survival requires the body.

The Cobbler is mistaken; the body determines personal identity.

1. The survivor is the Cobbler. 2. Post-switch person has the body of the Cobbler. Therefore, body determines identity.

Copying and implanting consciousness between bodies (Charlie Brown cases).

Potentially circular and makes survival depend on irrelevancies, which is implausible.

The definition of personal identity depends on a definition of identity.

The personal identity of Brown can be destroyed by something irrelevant to him (like a competitor being created somewhere else).

Just as consciousness-duplication can create problems for psychological theories, body-duplication can create problems for Thomson's bodily theory.

S knows p.

Someone can have a true opinion and not know; knowledge is not getting lucky.

The person with true opinion is no worse guide, but only succeeds at times; the person with knowledge will always succeed.

The statues run away if not tied down but stay in place if tied down. Relates to true opinions, which need to be tied down by an account of the reason why.

True opinion must be "tied down" by "an account of the reason why."

Succeeding sometimes, but not based on knowledge.

S knows p --->

Testimony, perception, memory, reason, introspection.

There are counterexample where JTB is not knowledge.

p = The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

p = Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.

A town has a line of fake barns and only one real barn. Someone points at the real barn and says, "That's a barn," but does not KNOW it.

JTB theory is not sufficient --- needs a condition. Otherwise, it can rely on epistemic luck, which is not knowledge.

S knows p --->

Belief has to track the truth. "If p were false, then S would not believe p. If p were true, then S would believe p."

What are the truth conditions for "If A were true, then B would be true"? Ex: If Smith had 7 coins, Smith would still believe p.

If p were false, S would not believe p.

p = I'm a person in a tank. Counterexample to First Tracking Theory.

If p were true, S would believe p.

S knows "That's a red barn" but doesn't know "That's a barn." Violates closure principle.

f S knows p and S knows (p → q), then S knows (or can know) q.

For any p, S does not know p.

Build a system of knowledge on the foundation of what cannot be doubted.

Infallibilism: if you can find any reason to doubt p, reject it. If some p cannot be doubted, p is known.

If I don't know my senses are not deceiving me, I don't know p. 2. I don't know my senses are not deceiving me. --- I don't know p.

1. If I don't know I'm not dreaming, I don't know p. 2. I don't know I'm not dreaming. --- I don't know p.

1. If I don't know I'm not deceived by a demon, I don't know p. 2. I don't know I'm not deceived by a demon. --- I don't know p.

1. If I don't know I'm not in SK, I don't know p. 2. I don't know I'm not in SK. --- I don't know p.