The effects of terrorism are harder to understand than the effects of revolutions.
Is it possible for terrorists to achieve their goals?
We study cases in which regimes have been successfully overthrown in the case of revolution.
We focus on a tactic in the case of terrorism.
If we define success as getting states to change their policies to be more in line with what the terrorists want, then terrorism is mostly unsuccessful in achieving its goals.
This doesn't mean that terrorism has no impact.
ter rorism can be very successful in depressing tourism, foreign direct investment, stock markets, and other sectors of the economy.
Society can feel the effects of a weakened economy, as well as increasing anxiety and insecurity, that undermines people's sense of well- being.
Countering terrorism can be costly and frustrating, with little to show for itself, and divert national resources while failing to address public concerns.
An eroded sense of confidence in the state can be the result.
Governments and their citizens may favor increasing state power and curtailing civil liberties in order to limit terrorists' scope for action in the quest for greater security.
This can weaken democratic institutions and civil liberties.
The result can be less trust in government.
Terrorists can bring down a regime.
In 1992, President Fujimori dissolved the legislature and suspended the constitution in order to battle two terrorist groups that were destabilizing the country.
The public supported this action because it was the only way to reestablish order.
Chechnya terrorism helped pave the way for Putin to win the presidency in 2000, and Russia used subsequent attacks as justification for removing democratic institutions and limiting civil liberties.
From Afghanistan, we know that terrorism can be used to cause international conflict.
The destruction of a regime is what most terrorists want.
In order to undermine the institutional fabric of state, society, and economy, terror ism uses violence against civilians, calling into question all those things we take for granted, including stability, security, and predictability.
Terrorists believe they can pave the way for revolution by disrupting the basic elements of modern life.
Political violence is related to terrorism and revolution.
It was not always this way.
The French Revolution gave rise to the concept of terrorism and revolution in modern politics.
For revolutionary leaders like de Robespierre, terror was an essential part of revolution.
According to Robespierre, terror is an emanation of virtue in the service of revolutionary change.
The relation between terrorism and revolution began to shift over time.
After a regime has been overthrown, revolutionaries concluded that terror is not needed to consolidate the revolution, but can instead be used as the means toward that revolutionary end.
A small group of people could speak up and start a revolution.
Terrorists can be understood not just in terms of who is attacking whom but also in their revolutionary nature.
Terrorists rarely seek limited goals, such as political or economic reform, since they see the entire political system as illegitimate.
All the dominant institutions can be shattered through their seemingly indiscriminate use of violence.
The people rise up, arm themselves and rebellion ensues.
They are taken by the throat, threaten their lives, and will be killed out of necessity.
The reactionary meat will be trimmed of fat, they will be torn to tatters and rags, and the remainders burned.
There is a link between terrorism and revolution.
The line between the two 222 CHAPTER SEVEN # POLITICAL VIOLENCE forms of political violence is blurry, but we can distinguish between them in terms of their targets.
The goal of guerrilla war is to follow traditional rules of war and not target civilians.
The decision was driven by political goals.
Guerrillas accept that their opponents are legitimate actors, and they want to be seen as legitimate by their opponents and the international community.
They do not deny the legitimacy of the other side when it comes to their demands, such as greater civil rights or independence for an ethnic group.
The differences in means and ends will affect how much states can negotiate with such groups.
During the civil conflict in Algeria in the 1990s, there were two nonstate groups that were operating.
Both fought the Algerian regime in different ways.
The armed wing of the FIS was created to target specific parts of the state that were seen as supporting the regime.
If certain demands were met, the FIS could come to a compromise with the regime.
The entire regime and political process was rejected by the GIA and they argued that anyone who cooperated with the state in any way, such as voting, deserved to be killed.
The killing was directed at the state, society, and the FIS.
Revolution and terrorism have close connections.
Terrorists believe that using violence will help set the stage for revolution.
In guerrilla war, more limited use of force shows a desire to work with existing institutions rather than overthrow them.
The issue for nonstate wielders of violence is whether they want to sit at the political table or knock it over.
We can apply these ideas to the most pressing example in contemporary domestic and international politics: religious violence.
The rise of ideology and other secular identities, such as nationalism, is a challenge to religion in the modern world.
Religion was forced out of the public and political sphere and into private life by the identities of Political Violence and Religion.
The role of religion in the public realm has come back to life.
The resurgence of religion is accompanied by a desire to unite faith and the state, transforming religion into an ideological foundation for a political regime.
As with many ideologies, fundamentalism is not necessarily violent.
Many fundamentalists believe that reestablishing God's sovereignty can be accomplished by withdrawing from politics and working to increase the societal power of religion.
This form of religious fundamentalism has a violent strain of thought.
They include institutional, ideational, and individual factors.
One of the factors is hostility to modernity.
Modern institutions, driven by states and nations, capitalism, ideology, secularism, individualism, and material prosperity, have stripped the world of greater meaning and driven people to despair.
Political violence is often embraced by those who initially enjoyed modernity, but at some point turned away from its "corrupt" lifestyle.
In societies where modern institutions are foreign in nature and poorly grafted onto traditional structures and values, this view is most powerful.
In Chapter 10, we will see this in developing countries.
The tension between traditional and modern institutions can be the greatest, which may explain why proponents of religious violence are often urban and well- educated individuals.
The sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer calls it a second factor.
The modern world marginalizes, humiliates, and degrades the views of religious believers in this view.
Those who hold this view see themselves as soldiers in a war between the righteousness of faith and its enemies.
Conspiracy theories point to shadowy forces in league to destroy the good.
People who hold these views can rationalize violence against civilians because they see the conflict not in terms of civilians but in terms of the guilty and the innocent.
The dehumanization of the enemy is an important part of political violence in justifying violence against civilians, since social or religious taboos against murder must be overcome.
Religion is a source of political violence because of messianic, apocalyptic, and utopian beliefs.
The role of the righteous is to restore the sovereignty of God even though modernity has gained the upper hand.
Violence is a form of ritual, whether in the form of self- sacrifice or the sacrifice of others.
These terms are used to describe the propaganda of the Islamic State.
An extreme form of fundamentalism is when a religious group resorts to violence because it requires them to change their faith in a way that undermines it.
These groups or movements tend to break away from the mainstream faith and other fundamentalists, who they accuse of having lost their way, by presenting their radical alternatives as restorations of religious truth.
Many of these radical views are far removed from the views of the fundamentalists.
It is a mistake to confuse fundamentalism with violence.
Modern political ideologies can be found with hostility toward rival institutions, dehumanization, and utopian views.
The bloody revolutions in the Soviet Union and China established communism.
The French Revolution of 1789 was described in 1856 as akin to a religious revolution directed toward "the regeneration of the human race" that was incapable of awakening.
Some examples of how religion and politics intersect to generate political violence can be considered.
Osama bin Laden, for example, has couched his violence in terms of a long global struggle against unbelievers.
The battles between the Islamic and Christian worlds in the Middle Ages are what bin Laden was referring to when he referred to the West as "crusaders".
Bin Laden argued that the crusade against Islam and its followers continues in the modern world, despite the West's conspiracies.
In the September 11 attacks, we can see how the logic of the war fits into a larger narrative.
These attacks were carried out by Al Qaeda in order to cause a backlash that they believed would intensify the conflict between the Islamic and non- Islamic worlds and lead to the overthrow of " un- Islamic" regimes in the Middle East.
This violence would lead to a final battle with the West and the restoration of an Islamic empire and golden age, argued the group.
Muslim civilians are fair targets in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.
Their "collaboration" with the forces of evil means that they can be killed and sacrificed to the cause, which is why this position is justified.
The right to "excommunicate" other Muslims is a claim made by the group, which makes them fair targets.
There are parallels between these views and the violent strains drawn from Chris tianity.
Racist groups in the United States claim that Western Christianity has been corrupted by a global Jewish conspiracy and that they want to rebuild Western society on the basis of a white race.
William Pierce died in 2002.
The National Alliance, a white supremacist organization, was formed in 1974 by a man with a PhD in physics.
The "cosmotheist" faith that was offered by Pierce was a faith that saw whites as belonging to a superior evolutionary track on the road to unity with God.
The state would be destroyed by this apocalypse, allowing the revolutionaries to wipe out all nonwhites.
This genocide would go on for a long time.
McVeigh was a soldier, and what he did was based on principle.
He was fighting against a government that was against his people.
Whatever is good for our people is good, and whatever harms our people is evil in this war.
Outside the monotheistic religions of the West, there is also violence.
A form of violent Buddhism has arisen in the country ofBurma, led by a monk who focuses his hostility on the country's Muslim minority.
The destruction of Buddhist communities in South and Southeast Asia by Islamic armies in the 12th century is the beginning of an ongoing threat to Muslims.
Muslims are an inherently violent race rather than followers of a religion, and followers of the movement have targeted them in a series of deadly attacks.
The goal of the 969 movement is to restore the role of Buddhism at the center of the nation and state as the country undergoes a tentative transition to democracy.
One important question we need to ask is whether the 969 movement is better described as terrorism, ethnic conflict, or some combination of the two.
The groups argued that an existing faith had lost its way.
The ability to recast the faith in an ideological manner was claimed by Osama bin Laden.
They viewed the world in terms of a battle between good and evil, purity and corruption.
They placed themselves in the role of warriors in the service of faith, able to mete out justice to those who were seen as the enemy, whether state or society.
They said that this violence was a sacrifice to the cause that would bring forth or restore a higher order.
Similar acts of political violence can be carried out by non religious groups.
The failures and humiliations of modernity, the creation of a group of "true believers" who see the world in stark terms of good versus evil, and the idea of a transformation that will destroy the old order and bring in a new age can all be attributed to secular ideologies.
Our discussion shows that political violence is a constant force in the modern world.
Countering Political Violence is about pursuing their own political objectives.
It is most likely that violence is motivated by institutional, ideational, and individual factors.
We see that the differences between secular and religious violence are not as great as we might have thought.
The response depends on the nature of the political violence.
Although violence varies from place to place, we can still make a few tentative observations, knowing that these are not ironclad answers.
One observation is that terrorism and revolution are less likely in democratic societies.
The simplest answer is that democracies allow for a significant degree of participation among a wide enough number of citizens to make them feel that they have a stake in the system.
While democracies produce their own share of cynicism and public unrest, they also appear to co-opt and diffuse the motives necessary for serious organized or mass violence against the state and civilians.
This isn't to say that democracies are impervious to political violence, as we have seen in the United States and elsewhere.
The observation is that democracies seem to be more effective at containing and limiting such groups by giving more options for political opposition.
One of the dangers is that terrorism and revolution can easily spread beyond the borders of a country.
Democracy doesn't offer protection against political violence carried out by groups outside the state, even if it is an important factor in preventing violence by its own citizens.
Open democratic societies may limit domestic conflict, but they also make for a more tempting target for political violence.
The classic dilemma of freedom versus security is raised in this case.
In the face of threats, democratic states and their citizens will often favor limiting certain civil liberties and increasing state autonomy and capacity in order to bring an end to political violence.
The 2001 PATRIOT Act is an example of a counterterrorism act in the United States.
Under certain conditions, suspects in the United Kingdom can be stripped of their citizenship if they are suspected of terrorism.
Terrorist attacks in Paris have allowed for raids and house arrests.
There are dangers here.
It may be dangerous to focus too much on security over freedom.
Placing too much power in the hands of the state to observe and control the public could seriously threaten to erode individual rights and with them democracy, creating what some have called a "surveillance state."
Since they confirm the idea that the state is scheming to destroy its opponents, these activities can contribute to further political violence.
Dramatic and visible solutions are often sought by people and politicians because they provide a sense of security.
Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety according to the old adage attributed to Benjamin Franklin.
We began the book with low levels of development.
After the invasion of Iraq, revolu and U.S. foreign policy in the region often come out.
The blue iswariof.
Nondemocratic regimes have been supported by U.S. foreign policy because it appeared impervi ness.
No one expected that in the region.
There is a reason why the Soviet Union would lead to some modest revolutions when they do.
It is not possible for geologists to tell us when an opposite occurred.
The signs of our institutional, ideational, and individual were less promising in the recent case of the Arab Spring.
The explanations are not seen as being stunted.
The comturn to the Human Development Index is a result of revolutionary change.
In countries with sig rule, this is true.
Tunisia, like Saudi Arabia, was a one- party system with a life expectancy that was less than that of China.
The regime is also maintained by gender inequalities.
Oil, as well as foreign aid from the United, has helped support many refused to fire on the population, helping pave of these states, creating systems built around the way for revolution and democratization.
Civil society in Egypt is weak due to state oppression and the military's ability to seize power for itself.
The military can't explain why revolution succeeded where it did, but they can be seen to have influenced the resources and strategies of political elites.
Ideational explanations are also used.
Many point to the role young people played in shaping the message of the protests that brought down President Hosni Mubarak.
The Bouazizi stood before the local governor's role of Islam as a democratic or fundamental office, amid the traffic, where he doused him ist force across the region, and set himself alight.
The began soon thereafter and spread across the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, raising common demands: dignity Egypt.
We should not forget the role that the Ennahda Party played in explaining the Arab Spring in Tunisia.
The role of individual action in sparking these revolutions should not be discounted.
The man who worked from 1 was 26 years old.
Tunisia's revolution took such a duce as a street vendor because institutional factors help explain a young age to support his family.
The ideational and institutional failed to pay bribes.
Why did the revolution overturn authori and not the tarian regimes in the Middle East?
Political violence is a complex issue for scholars.
Its objectives are often cast in idealistic terms.
When violence becomes an end in itself, it can come at a tremendous cost of human life.
Because political violence is a response to existing institutions, it's hard to generalize general properties from specific instances.
It may emerge in unexpected places and destroy the population before disappearing again.
It may be inactive for a long time, only to break out when certain conditions come together.
There is no single way to stop political violence.
Providing democratic institutions and opportunities for political contention should be balanced with military and legal methods to counter terrorism.
Even the most comprehensive forms of prevention can't guarantee that political violence won't break out.