Corporatism gives the public a limited influence in the policy making process.
Farmers or students may have an official organization with elected officers and resources that are meant to serve their interests.
Civil society is marginalized or eliminated in return for the regime being able to better control the public through these institutions.
For the average individual, a state- sanctioned organization is better than none, and many willingly participate in the hope that their needs will be met.
corporatism has been used as a means of control by many nondemocratic regimes.
Up to the 1970s, it existed in authoritarian Spain and Portugal.
In Spain, a single political party organized most of the business and labor interests into a limited number of "syndicates" that represented both owners and workers in different sectors of the economy.
Communist regimes are also corporatist.
In Cuba, all labor is organized under a single union that is controlled by the state.
In all of the corporatist regimes, a limited number of organizations represent and direct societal interests bring the public under state control.
Clientelism is more ad hoc than corporatism because it relies on individual patronage rather than organizations that serve a large group of people.
Clientelism doesn't require a set of organizations but allows those in power to target and respond to individuals and groups as they see fit, trading benefits for particular forms of support.
The state can use a number of perquisites in co-opting individuals.
Jobs within the state or in state- run sectors of the economy, business contracts or licenses, public goods such as roads and schools, and kickbacks and bribes are a few of the tools in its arsenal.
For example, leaders might use a nationalized industry for rent seeking, providing supporters with jobs and the ability to snatch off resources from that branch of the state.
Co-optation is likely to be more successful than coercion at maintaining nondemocratic regimes, since many in the public may actively support the regime in return for the benefits they derive from it.
Political opposition can be dealt with by incorporating opponents into the system or by withholding largesse.
The regime faces limitations.
Corporatist and clientelist regimes can run out of benefits if a lot of the economy is built around state- controlled industries that reward loyal with jobs or opportunities for corrupt practices.
In a regime where economic resources are given out for political reasons, there may be problems as productive resources are diverted to get the public's approval.
Russia and Zimbabwe are examples.
Assets and resources can quickly dry up.
The rule may be reinforced by emphasizing the veneration of the leadership.
A personality cult is the most extreme example.
In other words, personality cults try to create a charismatic form of authority for the political leader from the top down by convincing the public of the leader's admirable qualities.
A personality cult depends on the media and culture to spread flattering images of the leader.
The country's success is attributed to the power of the leader, while mistakes are blamed on the public or enemies.
The public may not believe the praise, but no one is willing to say so.
This is the case where charismatic power has faded over time and is held up only by force.
There is always a chance that the cult will break.
In 1989, the self- styled "conductor" of his country,Nicolae Ceausescu, was shown on national television reacting in a stunned and confused manner when attendees at a public rally he was addressing suddenly grew hostile.
Within three days, Ceausescu and his wife were executed by a firing squad.
A weaker but still powerful form of personality cults can be found.
The 1979 revolution and the country's Shia Muslim faith are portrayed as an embodiment of the Supreme Leader's image in shops and billboards around the country.
Despite his power, few Iranians would view him as a deity or believe in his powers.
Russia's Vladimir Putin has built around himself a similar kind of veneration as the embodiment of the state and regime, and some worry that China's President is in the process of doing the same.
Some nondemocratic regimes come to power and stay in power in a variety of ways, from rewards for compliance and support to threats and actual punishments.
Some people may view the regime as legitimate if there is a combination of carrots and sticks.
They can agree with the regime's ideology, benefit from its rule, venerate its leaders, or fear political change.
It may be hard for us to accept nondemocratic legitimacy.
In Western democracies, there is an assumption that the people are waiting for the chance to install democracy.
Any democratic regime can be just as legitimate as a nondemocratic one.
They enjoy a lot of public support if benefits are widespread enough and political change is seen as fraught with risk.
Many would suggest that the current Chinese regime enjoys widespread public support and that the public has little interest in democratization, which many citizens fear could bring political and economic instability.
It should be clear by now that nondemocratic regimes emerge for different reasons and persist in different ways by using different tools.
According to how they use the tools, political scientists classify such regimes.
Personal and monarchical, military, one- party, theocratic, and illiberal regimes are the most important forms of nondemocratic rule.
The power of a single strong leader who relies on charismatic or traditional authority to maintain power is the basis of personal and monarchical rule.
The strongest means of control under military rule is the monopoly of violence.
One- party rule creates a broad membership as a source of support and oversight.
Theocracies have a claim to rule on behalf of God.
The basic structures of democracy are often not respected in illiberal regimes.
In liberal democracies, we find heads of state and government, judiciaries, legislatures, and elections.
These are not subject to the rule of law because they do not reflect the preferences of those in power.
When people think of nondemocratic rule, they usually think of personal and monarchical rule, because before modern politics, states, and economies came into being, people were ruled by powerful figures.
Personal and monarchical rule often rests on the claim that one person alone is fit to run the country, with no clear regime or roles to constrain that person's rule.
Under this form of rule, the state and society are often taken to be possessions of the leader, to be discarded as he sees fit.
The ruler is not a subject of the state, but a subject of society.
Since rulers justify their control through the logic that they alone are the embodiment of the people and therefore uniquely qualified to act on the people's behalf, ideology may be weak or absent.
A strong personality cult or reliance on the traditional authority of bloodlines may be associated with this claim.
Since a patrimonial leader trades benefits for political support, patriimonialism can be seen as a form of clientelism.
Under patrimonialism the benefits are only available to a small group of regime supporters inside the state.
The ruling group gets benefits in return for obeying the ruler's will.
In return for personal profit, the state elites swear loyalty to the leadership.
Under patrimonialism only the ruler's own personal followers benefit from this form of co- optation.
Everyone in society is held in check.
The rule of Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1966 to 1997 was an example of personal rule based on patrimonialism.
Mobutu used patrimonialism as a way to maintain his power over time.
Mobutu built his patrimonial regime around Zaire's abundant natural resources, such as diamonds, gold, and copper.
He used the resources to build up his personal fortune, but he didn't use them to benefit the country as a whole.
Mobutu's coterie of supporters were willing to defend him in order to maintain their economic privileges.
In parts of the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, monarchies are still strong.
When they are not monarchies, regimes with a single ruler attempt to keep power within one family, typically transferring it from father to son.
The leaders of such regimes function much like traditional monarchs.
In Africa, personal rule and patrimonial regimes are enriched through control over natural resources or trade.
Russia has moved in the direction of patrimonialism as well, with economic and political power held in the hands of a narrow elite around President Vladimir Putin.
Military rule is a form of nondemocratic regime.
Over the past 50 years, military rule has become more common in Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia.
When governments and states are struggling with legitimacy and stability, often as a result of modernization, and where there is a high level of public unrest or violence, the military has sometimes chosen to intervene directly in politics.
A sense among military leaders that the current government threatens the military's or the country's interests is combined with this view.
If people believe that the military can bring an end to corruption, prevent revolution, and restore stability, then military rule may have widespread public support.
Military rule usually emerges through a coup d'etat.
In some cases, military actors may claim that they have seized control reluctantly, promising to return the state and government to civilian rule once stability has been restored.
This happened in Thailand in 2006 and in Egypt in 2011.
Under military rule, political parties and civil liberties are often restricted and civilian political leaders may be killed.
Military rule can be used in a variety of ways, since they have an overwhelming capacity for violence.
This form of government lacks both a specific ideology and a traditional source of authority.
Rational authority is what the military must fall back on if it wants legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
Public participation is no longer seen as an obstacle to effective and objective policy making.
In the 1960s and 1970s, authoritarian bureaucratic regimes emerged in a number of less developed countries as rapid modernization and industrialization generated a high degree of political conflict.
The interests of the working class and peasants clashed with those of the state and industry, who wanted rapid economic growth.
Military Models of Nondemocratic Rule 193 rule was advocated by business leaders and the state bureaucracy in order to prevent the working class and peasants from gaining power over the government.
Over the past 30 years, many authoritarian regimes have changed.
There is no reason to think that military rule won't return in difficult times, as it did in Egypt.
Disregard with democracy can help facilitate modernization and development according to supporters of military rule.
South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile are examples of success stories.
There is a problem of selection bias where people only look for economic success.
A one-party rule is a regime in which a single political party dominates politics and excludes other parties from power.
corporatist functions are served by the ruling party.
Membership and participation help integrate the people into the political regime.
In most communist countries, the party membership is less than 10 percent, but this still means that hundreds of thousands or millions of people are party members.
Through membership, the party can rely on a large segment of the public that is willing to help develop and support the policies of nondemocratic rule as well as to transmit information back to the leadership on developments in all aspects of society.
Smaller units or "cells" that operate at the university, workplace, or neighborhood level are often broken down into single- party regimes.
These cells help to deal with local problems and concerns and keep an eye on society as a whole.
The presence of the party helps the party maintain control over the public.
Privileges that are otherwise denied to the public at large are granted to members of the party in return for their support.
They may have access to resources that non members don't.
The positions in government and other important areas of the economy are reserved for party members.
A large group of individuals in society who benefit from the regime are willing to defend it.
People who embrace party membership only for the personal benefits may desert the leadership in a time of crisis.
The party serves as a way to mobilize.
The leadership uses the party as an instrument to deliver propaganda that lauds the virtues of the current regime and government; it relies on its rank- and- file members, through demonstrations and mass rallies, to give the appearance of widespread public support and enthusiasm for the leadership.
It uses party members to control those who do not support the regime.
Compliance and support are ensured by co- optation.
One-party regimes have been present in all of the cases of communism and fascists.
They can be found in many nondemocratic regimes around the world.
The government restricts other parties so that they can't challenge the current regime.
For a long time, this was the case in Mexico, which was dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party.
Cuba, North Korea, China, Vietnam, and Laos are examples of one-party regimes.
Theocratic rule is the most difficult form of nondemocratic rule to describe and analyze.
A Christian theocracy might look very different from a Jewish one.
Current examples of theocracy are hard to describe.
There are no remaining theocracies, which would make a discussion of the term irrelevant in contemporary politics.
Even if theocratic rule does not exist in pure form, we can observe elements of it in several countries.
One of the recent challenges to ideology has been the rise of fundamentalism, which we defined as the fusion of religion and politics into an ideology that seeks to merge religion and the state.
If faith is the sole source of the regime's authority, democratic institutions would be rendered subservient or in contradiction to the will of God.
Most of the time, the goal remains hypothetical.
There are cases where theocratic institutions are present.
One example of a country that combines monarchical and theo cratic forms of rule is Saudi Arabia.
The king is the supreme religious leader and the ruling family is in charge of politics.
In Saudi Arabia, conversion from Islam is a death sentence, and other religions and sects within Islam are brought under strict control.
The Islamic State has gained control over large parts of Iraq and Syria, and some fear that other countries in the Middle East could follow suit.
Slavery for some non- Muslim peoples and the death penalty for activities viewed as un- Islamic have been imposed in areas under their control.
Theocratic movements have gained power in places other than majority Muslim states.
Chapter 7 contains more detail on this.
We should not confuse religiosity and a desire for religion to play a greater role in politics with a desire for theocracy.
Iran is an example of a regime type that is growing in popularity around the world.
A large group of countries, such as Turkey, are categorized as neither "free" nor "not free" but as "partly free", meaning they fall somewhere between democratic and nondemocratic regimes.
Many of the familiar aspects of democracy are present in these regimes.
The rule of law is weak as a starting point.
All the democratic institutions that rest upon the rule of law are poorly respected.
The public has the right to vote, political parties compete, and executives, legislatures, and judiciaries have their own arenas of authority.
These institutions and processes are not consistent with democracy.
Executives have a lot of power.
The country's ability to remove its president is limited by this power.
Presidents in illiberal systems rely on referenda to confirm their power.
Legislative institutions are less able to check the power of the executive, and judicial institutions are often packed with the supporters of those in power.
Political competition can be found on paper, but parties and groups are restricted or harassed.
We looked at politics in Chapters 2 and 3.
After gaining inde by a liberation movement, Zimbabwe, India and Pakistan took different paths.
Zimbabwe and South Africa are neighbors of the National Union- Patriotic Front, which relied on politics to achieve majority rule.
The Rhodesian government over the past three decades could not begin negotiations for a transition to have been more different.
The first elections cratic transition in South Africa was held in 1980.
As we read at the opening of this democracy in Zimbabwe, it never became an institutionalcontrast.
Zimbabwe has undergone several decades regime over the course of 20 years, which eroded until of political and economic decline.
At times the answers seem to be conflicting.
Many oppress the black majority.
The answer is simply in leadership.
Nelson's leadership of the ANC, even while it was in prison, was exceptional.
He used violent means to bring down the regime.
His imprisonment increased his stature at home and the ANC grew stronger.
The government released pressure on South Africa in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the isolation and the growing power of the black struggle.
The resistance movement in Zimbabwe was led by the ANC and other political parties, and by several different and clashing figures who inaugurated full democratic elections in 1994.
Robert Mugabe came to power for nearly two decades and has been a stable liberal democracy.
The set argument assumes that political change is much earlier.
The country of Rhodesia was ruled by a white minority, yet other institutional factors set the stage for the economy to dominate.
ZANU- PF was an authoritarian party that did not owe any internal democratic practices or suppressed external opposition.
The ANC's members worked to include other opposition groups under a common political umbrella.
The ANC benefited from close ties to the Soviet Union and its founding charter called for the nationalization of the state.
The ANC did not call for a revolution as a result of attacks on security forces, but it did call for a revolution against capitalism.
The majority population in both South Africa and Zimbabwe makes them different from each other in how they mobilize the babwe's.
Violence became the primary means of transportation in Zimbabwe because of the political divergence.
South Africa is very urbanized.
When ZANU-pf came to power in 1980, it relied on violence comparison with Zimbabwe to suppress its opponents.
The party's focus has been on agriculture.
South growing opposition in the 1990s seized Africa's urbanization, combined with its agricultural land held by white Zimbabweans, and arrested oppositional leaders.
The ANC helped create and institution economic collapse and international isolation.
It became a 1 because ZANU- PF could not rely on such foundations.
The ANC was careful about how it used violence in its struggle because of how society in South Africa had given it.
The judicial system is used to harass opponents.
The military isn't usually subject to civilian control.
Changing electoral rules, vote buying, intimidation, and barring candidates from running are some of the ways elections are manipulated.
There is a gray area between democratic rule and nondemocratic rule in liberal regimes.
These regimes look like democracies on paper, but they are not.
The question is whether illiberal regimes are transitional, in the process of moving from nondemocratic to democratic rule, or a new form of nondemocracy that uses the trappings of democracy to perpetuate its control.
We are seeing more and more examples of countries where the transition from authoritarianism to democracy has stopped and government institutions are democratic in name only.
The global trend has been away from this form of rule for decades.
In the early part of the last century, democratic countries were relatively unaffected by the economic downturn, whereas nondemocratic regimes and fascist ideologies seemed to promise new ways to restructure state, economic, and societal institutions.
The people will accept the victory of the strong men and obey them.
The world will be better for it if life descends to a level of general uniformity.
The exact opposite has happened.
Less than a quarter of countries were democratic in the 70s.
There are advanced economic, political, and societal arguments regarding the sources of nondemocratic rule.
Nondemocratic rule has lost a lot of its power.
Fifty years ago, ideologies on nondemocratic regimes could mobilize people with visions of a world to be changed.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, there is no strong ideology combining the absence of individual freedom with a broader goal.
Limitations on political rights are necessary for political stability or economic development, but they no longer offer an alternative vision for politics.
It's hard to justify nondemocratic regimes through a universal set of ideas.
There are some concerns if we look closely at our figure.
According to Freedom House, over the course of the past decade, there has been a steady decline in political rights and civil liberties around the world.
This is the 11th year of decline in global democracy.
Even in some established democracies, the rule of law and freedom of expression have been affected.
The United States is included.
Over the past twenty years, the number of Americans who approve of having a strong leader who doesn't have to bother with elections has risen to a third of those surveyed, with even higher numbers among those under 29.10
This may be providing a new lease on life for authoritarianism with its promise to provide stability in exchange for personal liberty.
In the next chapter, we will consider trends that may increase political violence.
Larry Diamond, Christopher Walker, andMarc F. Plattner are authors.