We looked at globalization's impact on political, economic, and societal institutions and whether it was making the world better or worse.
It seems obvious that globalization is real and can be dangerous in light of the recent global recession.
The situation is more complicated because of the different ways we think about globalization.
The data presents a mixed picture.
Let us start with globalization.
Some think it will lead to greater transparency and global democratic institutions, while others think it will lead to a loss of democratic participation and the rise of rival nonstate and nondemocratic actors.
In both of these cases, the assumption is that globalization means the eclipse of the state, yet there is not a lot of evidence to back that up.
As globalization has spread, so has the number of states, but sovereignty remains a critical demand of people around the world.
50 years after the creation of the European Union, no other part of the world has shown a desire or ability to duplicate the model.
The European Union is facing unprecedented difficulties.
Over the past decade, authority has been re-established in many areas.
Many have assumed that the stateless nature of the Internet and electronic communications would eliminate the state, but governments have found ways to regulate content and limit access.
European Internet privacy laws and censorship of websites and social media like Facebook are examples.
It seems that the nature of states' capacity and autonomy is changing to meet new challenges, rather than being more transparent under globalization.
New technologies can weaken or empower states and nonstate actors alike, so the idea that stateless actors such as terrorists are beyond the reach of states seems overstated.
Terrorist groups aspire to be more centralized than globalization suggests.
The name of the Islamic State fighting in Syria and Iraq shows its desire to form a military, conquer land, and build a modern empire.
The aspiration to statehood still matters for now.
In the area of economic globalization, our evidence could be more comprehensive if the picture of states and globalization is not clear.
Even though people don't agree on the effects of economic globalization, the limited data we have indicates a profound change over the last two decades.
Developing countries now make up half of world GDP when measured by purchasing power parity, and much of this growth is driven by international trade and investment.
Excuses are in order.
In contrast to our idea of agglomeration of far flung businesses, the merger of firms continues to be heavily driven by such factors as physical proximity.
There is a reason that Silicon Valley has a strong research university and a network of personal connections.
The home bias in economic activity continues to be strong, much more so than we expected.
Since the 1980s, extreme poverty has fallen as a percentage of the world population.
China's integration into the global market is one of the reasons for the change.
In other words, what we see as a uniform and inexorable process of globalization may be more effectively viewed through the lens of traditional comparative politics: changes in the domestic political and economic institutions first in China and now in India.
Many of the economic changes that have occurred during the period of globalization don't have anything to do with taking stock of globalization.
The expansion of computer technology has replaced unskilled and skilled labor in the economy.
The applications of these innovations, both at home and abroad, are critical to explaining rising inequality.
We confront the limitations of our data here.
Supporters and opponents of societal globalization often start from the idea that national and local identities are giving way in the face of broader global forces.
The basis of their disagreement is whether this will be a peaceful process or a positive outcome.
The 2005-9 World Values Survey asked people if they saw themselves as world citizens.
The most positive responses among those under age 29 were for this proposition.
Between 2005-9 and 2010-14, the figure increased slightly.
The increase seems to be consistent with globalization.
We get a different view when we look at other related questions.
When respondents are asked if they trust other people, the response is negative.
Young people have higher levels of distrust than older people.
Sixty-three percent of people under the age of 29 don't trust people of other nationalities, compared to 58 percent of people over 50.
The level of distrust doesn't correlate with globalization of a country.
The Swiss Federal Institute of Technology developed the Index of Globalization.
Sweden and Australia are two countries with the lowest levels of youth distrust that are also highly globalized.
Highly globalized countries like Cyprus, Malaysia, and Slovenia exhibit high levels of distrust.
The Netherlands, the world's most globalized country, has high levels of youth distrust, which is 15 percent higher than Sweden, the United States, Australia, and Germany.
Younger and more globalized generations don't feel a sense of trust in other nationalities.
As countries become more globalized, younger generations may feel more connected, but also wary of those connections.