Studied by 0 peopleDirect Realism
Our senses provide us with knowledge of reality as it really is - I have a direct causal relationship with the world.
Eg - I perceive my teacher’s shirt as blue, because it is truly blue.
This means the laws of the sciences are correct.
The world we perceive is mind-independent.
We perceive objects in the world immediately
When we perceive objects we are directly aware of the objects themselves
Bertrand Russell’s case for direct realism
‘It seems to me that I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print. …’
5 Precepts of Direct Realism
The world is made up of physical objects;
Physical objects can be known through sense experience;
Physical objects exist independent of our perception;
The objects we perceive continue to exist even when we cease to perceive them;
As our perceptions are generally accurate, we have good reason to claim the world is as we perceive it.
Arguments supporting direct realism
In tune with common sense - common sense realism
in Problems of Philosophy Russell argues we should accept the common sense beliefs we are instinctually inclined to unless they lead to inconsistency
Avoids scepticism and gives a clear account of how we have knowledge of the world
our senses provide immediate access to its true nature
Easily explains how we can execute practical actions on a daily basis
through interactions with objects in the external world
Explains why I perceive what I do
I see the tree as green because it is green, my perception of it is regular and predictable because there is a green tree causing my perception
Explains why individuals agree about what they perceive
e.g. if a friend & I look at a tree, we describe it in the same way because there is an actual tree
Response 1: Argument from Illusion
Outlined by Michael Huemer, demonstrates that the argument does not call into question the ideas of direct realism
Stick appearing bent in a glass of water which shows that we perceive some objects in a way that isn’t consistent with its actual properties.
So our perceptions of objects are not always consistent with the reality of things. Therefore we must not be perceiving objects directly.
P1. When viewing a straight stick half-submerged in water, one is directly aware of something bent.
P2. No relevant physical thing is bent in this situation.
C1. Therefore, in this situation, one is directly aware of something non-physical.
P3. What one is directly aware of in this situation is the same kind of thing that one is directly aware of in NORMAL, non-illusory perception.
C2. Therefore, in normal perception, one is directly aware of non-physical things.
Response to the argument from Illusion
Simply, our sense data observes a bent stick but there are obvious conditions affecting the sense data
I am directly aware of the real straw, but it appears bent due to the circumstances (the way light is refracted when passing through water)
This is not a third thing mediating my perception of the straw but just the manner of its appearance
So realists don’t need to suppose that objects have to appear directly as they are
And indirect realists shouldn’t explain illusions by positing entities like ‘appearances’ or ‘sense data’ which are directly observed
Response 2: Perceptual Variation
The world that I perceive is not necessarily the world as it is.
Example: I think the table is brown.
The colour is not something which is inherent in the table, but something depending upon the table and the spectator and the way the light falls on the table.
We do not perceive things in the world, we only perceive sense data (what I see, smell, hear, etc.) of the table so what I am perceiving is mind dependent.
Sense data provides an appearance of reality - it shows me something about the appearance of the world but the world that I perceive is not necessarily the world as it is. Therefore the sense data is separate from the world I see - there is a veil of perception. I am only observing MY sense experience, therefore I cannot be certain.
Outline the Sapier Wharf hypothesis
Argues we have no concept of the colour blue and therefore cannot apparently perceive the colour blue
Shows how our perceptions are altered by the language available to us
Iris Murdoch takes it further by asking the question of ‘Are there things that exist which we don’t know exist as we don’t have a word for them?’
Berkeley’s water - eg of perceptual variation
Uses Locke’s example of water - if you place a hot hand and a cold hand in a bowl of lukewarm water, you will feel two different temperatures
If material objects possess mind independent properties (as DR claims), then how can one object have contradictory/incompatible properties - hot and cold
In reality an object cannot possess incompatible properties as this is contradictory
So material objects cannot have mind-independent properties and the DR argument falls apart
Response to the Perceptual variation argument
Perceptual variation merely critiques the view that we perceive the properties of objects as they really are
But with the water example, the water is still really lukewarm (and we have empirical methods to prove this) even if it appears cold
This is because one of the properties of lukewarm water is that it can appear different temperatures
So it doesn’t follow that there must be something between the objects we perceive and ourselves (e.g. sense data)
BR’s claim that we observe many different colours on the table-top does not actually refute the claim that the table-top is a form colour.
Response 3: Hallucinations, dreams, and evil demons
2 people: Sally and Sam, each of whom is having an experience of seeming to see a pineapple. Sally is simply perceiving a pineapple in the normal way. Sam, however, is having an incredibly realistic hallucination of a pineapple, induced by brain scientists who have sophisticated technology for electrically stimulating Sam’s brain. Their perceptions of the pineapple are indistinguishable, yet one is a veridical (truthful/accurate) perception and the other is a hallucination
As both Sally and Sam are experiencing the same perceptions, we can conclude that our sense data is independent of the real world so direct realism can’t distinguish between differing perceptions of reality
What we are directly aware of during veridical perception must only be in the mind. So veridical perception involves sense data and we perceive the world indirectly
Direct realist cannot distinguish between differing perceptions of reality.
Syllogism for argument from Hallucination
P1: Perceptions from hallucinations are indistinguishable from veridical perceptions
P2: Perceptions from hallucinations are entirely mind-dependent
P3: Veridical perceptions must also be mind-dependent
C1: Therefore, we must not be perceiving mind-independent objects directly
C2: We are unable to distinguish whether our perceptions are actually caused by mind-independent objects
C2: Therefore, direct realism fails
Response to argument from Hallucination
The argument from hallucination says that perceptions from hallucinations are indistinguishable from perceptions from reality.
However, direct realists may argue that even though hallucinations are a possibility, they do not necessarily disregard the fact that our perception is generally reliable and it allows us to navigate the external world correctly (hence why DR forms the basis of natural sciences)
Even though we cannot fully trust our perceptions due to the likes of hallucinations and such, our perceptions do allow us to correctly operate within the world (most of the time) so they are therefore a reliable source of perception
Response 4: Time Lag argument
In The Problems of Philosophy Russell refers to our experience of a storm. We might hear the thunder, but there is a time-lag between the thunderclap and our hearing it. Similarly, because light travels faster than sound, we see lightning before hearing thunders, even thought both events happen at the same time.
Philosophers give examples of distant stars. When I look at a constellation of stars I am looking at objects from millions of years ago, The stars I perceive may even have ceased existing.
In these cases, the time difference between the real phenomenon and my perception of it demonstrates, once again, that I am only perceiving things through my senses and I am not experiencing the world as it actually is.
Response to Time Lag argument
The direct realist can argue that this response confuses what we perceive with how we perceive it.
We perceive objects via light and sound waves and it also takes time for these light and sound waves to travel through space.
BUT what we are perceiving is still a mind-independent object – it’s just we are perceiving it as it was moments ago rather than how it is now.
Indirect Realism
There is an external world, but the world we perceive is not necessarily the world as it is. (Empiricism)
We perceive the external world indirectly THROUGH our senses.
‘We do not perceive things in the world, we only perceive sense data’ Russell
A being without the philosophy of mind would not be able to conceive such an indirect relationship with the external world.
In indirect realism there is no innate knowledge. All knowledge is mind-dependent.
Sense Data
Objects we are aware of when we perceive the world
Sense data are the things we are directly aware of in perception
Sense data are dependent on the mind
Sense data have the properties that perceptually appear to us
What do indirect realists say about the external world?
They argue there is an external world but the world I perceive is not necessarily the world as it is
This is because we perceive the external world only through our senses - all our knowledge about the world comes through our senses
We perceive the external world indirectly through our senses
Veil of perception
A being without the philosophy of mind would not be able to conceive such an indirect relationship with the world
In indirect realism there is no innate knowledge
Empiricism
Empiricism argues that all our knowledge starts with the senses. That means that we come to know about the world through empirical observations (our experience of the world).
Empirical knowledge is acquired a posteriori. Such knowledge is not necessarily true. Empirical knowledge is inductive and is assessed according to probability.
A posteriori, empirical observations of the world are contingent. The word ‘contingent’ means ‘dependent on other thing’
Empiricism says all a priori knowledge is of analytic truths.
Knowledge that is mind-dependent (or perceived though the senses) = knowledge of ‘particulars’
Knowledge which is true independent of the mind = knowledge of ‘universals’
Locke argues that we reach conclusions about the world based on probabilities rather than proofs
Because empiricism is based on probability rather than proof, the conclusions about the world cannot be ‘true or false’, ‘valid or invalid’, or ‘necessary or impossible’.
These inductive arguments are either strong or weak, according to how probable it is that the conclusion is true.
Empirical observations about the world are contingent
contingent = dependent on other things
Locke’s Empiricism: all knowledge starts with the senses
The mind is like white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas. All our knowledge is founded from experience. - Tabula Rasa
An unborn child ‘differs not much from the state of a vegetable’, and passes the greatest part of its time without perception or thought.
Empirical knowledge is acquired a posteriori. Such knowledge is not necessarily true. Empirical knowledge is INDUCTIVE and is assessed according to probability.
A posteriori, empirical observations of the world are CONTINGENT - ‘dependent on other things’.
Inductive arguments are not ‘true’ or ‘false’, or ‘necessary’ or ‘contingent’. They are ‘strong’ or ‘weak’.
Primary Qualities
Inseparable from an object and simply perceived by senses (eg solidity)
Russell’s table: size, shape, number
Secondary Qualities
Produced by the perceiver of an object, so not an aspect of the object itself (eg colour, sound)
Russell’s table: colour, smell, taste
How do sensations and reflections differ?
Sensations:
More immediate to us than reflections
Sense-dependent
E.g. the taste of raspberries
Involuntary
Simple and unanalysable
Reflections:
Complex, derived from our empirical experiences of the world
The ideas of our own mental operations
E.g. I like the taste of raspberries
E.g. remembering/comparing
The 3 Waves of Doubt
Senses + Illusion, Hallucinating, Scepticism about external world
Responses to Locke: scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects
If my knowledge is gained through the senses then my apparent perception of the external objects of the world is only made up of the perceptions of my sense experiences.
But what if there were no physical world corresponding to my sense experiences? In such a case it would be of no consequence, I would still perceive what I believe to be the external world in exactly the same way. The only issue is that the external world would not be real.
However, if we only perceive sense data and not the external world’s objects, how could we reach any conclusions about the external world - Eg the passage of time or causation? Would things only exist when we perceive them?
Scepticism - asks questions about the existence and nature of the external world.
Explain the argument that indirect realism leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects
Scepticism - doubting aspects of the external world
Solipsism - the rejection of the existence of everything except our own consciousness
if the world we perceive is not necessarily the world as it is
There is a veil of perception which separates us form the objects we perceive
If there is a veil of perception and our senses are unreliable then we begin to doubt our empirical senses
I do not know if my perceptions are accurate (Hume ‘the senses alone are not to be depended on’) but all my knowledge comes from my sense
Due to Philosophy of Mind, I cannot confirm that others perceive what I perceive
I also cannot confirm that other minds exist
If other minds do not exist then does an external world exist?
Hume’s Scepticism in his Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding
The mind never has anything to present to it but perceptions, and cannot possibly experience their connection with objects. the belief in such a connection, therefore, has no foundation in reasoning because reasoning would have to start from something known through experience.
Locke’s Responses to the challenge of scepticism
Locke defended his argument by maintaining that the external world exists independent of our perceptions.
‘the argument for the involuntary nature of experience’
‘the argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience’
These two arguments are sometimes combined and referred to as ‘the resemblance thesis’ - our sense experiences of objects in the external world resemble the actual objects in the external world.
The Involuntary Nature of Experience
In contrast to these involuntary sensations, complex reflections of memory and imagination somehow allow us to choose what we experience. Their causes must be external to our minds - an external world must exist.
Locke concludes that whatever causes our perceptions must be something external to the mind as we are unable to control these perceptions.
However, even if Locke succeeds in proving something external, he does NOT succeed in proving that sense data are an accurate representation of the external world. this still enables the sceptic to argue that the external world could be completely different from the world we perceive.
Sense experiences are involuntary
Eg - if you touch a flame you cannot NOT feel pain
So whatever causes our perceptions must be external to our mind
However, our complex reflections of memory allow us to choose our experiences
So Locke ‘proves’ there is an external world, but does not prove that sense data is an accurate representation of the world
So sceptics can still argue that the external world could be completely difference from what we perceive.
The Argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience
The idea that difference senses often confirm information of each other
Molyneux Problem: Consider a man who was born blind and has learnt to distinguish and name a globe and a cube by touch.
Would he be able to distinguish and name these objects simply by sight, if he could see?
Locke’s response: The man would recognise the globe and cube because other sense experiences would be consistent with the objects being a globe and a cube. They do not exist in isolation, so they give an accurate description of the world when combined.
The Coherence of Various kinds of Experience: Catharine Trotter Cockburn
Cockburn questions Berkeley’s theory of perception and defends Locke by arguing that our sense experiences are consistent (with one another) and regular.
Cockburn questions Berkeley’s theory of perception and defends Locke by arguing that the combination of our sense experiences creates a cumulative case which offers us a coherent and consistent view of the external world.
She argued that such coherence demonstrates that the external world is independent of the mind
She emphasises this point by considering a person with only one sense. Such a person would have such a limited experience of the external world
Cockburn argues that our sense experiences are consistent (with one another) and regular.
eg imagine you were blindfolded and given a dice, an object you have never seen before. It is highly likely that when the blindfold is removed the dice would look very similar to how you expected it to.
So not only does the external world exist, it resembles what our perceptions show us
However, we cannot actually prove that the world we perceive is the world as it really is so the resemblance theory is just the most likely explanation
Russell’s argument that The External World is the best hypothesis
Russell provided a response to this problem of scepticism in Problems of Philosophy.
P1. Because our sense experiences are private to individuals it follows that no two people can actually experience exactly the same perceptions of the world.
P2. Two people in the same place and at the same time can have identical perceptions of the world.
P3. The best explanation is that there must be physical objects in the world which correspond to those perceptions.
C. Therefore physical objects exist.
Russell contradicts his argument from ‘best hypothesis’
Russell rejects this argument.
Because he is producing an inductive a posteriori argument, he must follow the rules of inductive a posteriori arguments. These rules tell us we only reach probabilities about the objects of perception - he cannot actually prove the existence of other minds.
Therefore he cannot actually prove the existence of other minds. This makes the above argument internally inconsistent.
Russell’s reformulation of his best hypothesis argument
If the cat appears at one moment in one part of the room, and at another in another part, it is natural to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other.
There is no way to get beyond the veil of perception argument, but an external world is the best explanation for sense data.
Berkeley’s Idealism
Immaterialism (attacks all forms of materialism)
All that exists are minds and their ideas
So-called physical objects do not exist mind-independently
They are no more than collections of ideas or sense data appearing in minds
But they continue to exist when not being perceived by finite human minds (esse est percipi) - the universe is sustained in existence through being perceived by the infinite mind of God
God directly causes our ideas / sense data
Berkeley argued that the resemblance thesis is inconsistent
The mind perceives nothing but its own ideas
He agreed with Locke that the immediate objects of perception are ideas in the mind but goes on to argue that you cannot maintain the resemblance thesis (that our ideas of primary qualities resemble primary qualities)
The idea of resemblance only works if two things are said to be similar to each other
e.g. You cannot compare a sense of colour with a sense of smell
So how can we compare mental ideas and material qualities given that only the former can be perceived
An idea can only be like another idea - ‘I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be nothing but another colour or figure’
For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must in addition give it some quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion abstracted from all other qualities are inconceivable.
Explain the response to Berkeley’s developments of Locke’s resemblance thesis
He’s guilty of epistemic hyperbole (Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa)
Just because an idea might not resemble something mind dependent doesn’t mean it definitely doesn’t
Berkely’s idealism: To be is to perceived
P1: What we think of as the external world is inseparable from our perceptions.
P2. Perceptions are dependent on the mind (mind-dependant)
C1. The external world is the product of an idea
P3. It is inconceivable that the idea of the external world could be the product of my mind
C2. The external world which we perceive must be the product of God’s mind
Berkeley’s attack on realism
P1. We perceive ordinary objects (houses, trees, etc)
P2. We perceive only ideas
C. Therefore, ordinary objects are ideas
P1 of this argument is hard to deny - but what about P2? There are good reasons to conclude that ‘we do not perceive things in the world, we only perceive sense data’. So Berkley is on familiar ground. But does this logically take us to his conclusion?
Berkeley argues that we indirectly perceive material things, we directly (immediately) perceive ideas. - the things we perceive with our senses are ideas (mind-dependent) and these ideas represent external material objects, thereby allowing us to perceive them.
Explain Berkeley’s criticisms of Locke’s empiricism
He claimed Locke had no justification for distinguishing between our ideas of secondary and primary qualities
both are only ideas in the mind and as such are equally susceptible to illusions
So there is no reason to think that one type fundamentally resembles the qualities of material objects
He argues this by saying we can't imagine an object without secondary qualities so they must be just as essential to the object as primary ones
We can’t think of a shape (primary quality) without colour (secondary quality)
So you can’t separate primary and secondary qualities
Both are mind-dependent (as secondary qualities are mind-dependent) and just as susceptible to illusion
‘But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable.’
Explain the response to Berkeley’s criticism of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities
Secondary qualities aren’t mind dependent
Locke just says that they can cause mind-dependent sensations in us - the qualities themselves are still mind-independent
So just because you can’t separate primary and secondary qualities, doesn’t mean they are mind-dependent
Only the sense of these qualities exist in the mind but the qualities themselves exist mind-independently
Explain the argument for idealism using immaterialism
Immaterialism (attacks all forms of materialism)
Argues that direct and indirect realism fail as they cannot prove that the external world exists as a material entity
Asserts that what we think of as the external world is inseparable from our perceptions and perceptions are dependent on the mind therefore, the external world we perceive is mind-dependent and so is the product of an idea
It is inconceivable that the external world which we perceive might be a product of my mind and so, the external world which we perceive must be the product of the divine or God’s mind
What is the syllogism for the argument for idealism using immaterialism?
P1: What we think of as the external world is inseparable from our perceptions
P2: Perceptions are dependent on the mind (mind-dependent)
C1: The external world is the product of a idea
P3: It is inconceivable that the idea of the external world could be the product of my mind
C2: The external world which we perceive must be the product of God’s mind
Explain the criticisms of the argument Berkeley’s idealism
Berkeley writes in defence of his belief in God (he’s led by a conclusion not by the evidence) making him an apologist and the argument corrupt
It also does not necessarily follow that the external world is the product of an idea as P1 and 2 (veil of perception) leave other possibilities
That there is an external world and it is the one we perceive (direct realism)
That there is an external world but it is not the one we perceive (indirect realism)
Explain the argument for Idealism which says that realism promotes scepticism and atheism
Due to the a-posteriori nature of realism it can theoretically lead to scepticism as we can’t demonstrate/prove that our senses aren’t misleading us
It promotes atheism as it describes the external world in a way that it can continue to exist without the assistance of God
Berkeley starts his attack with the following argument as presented in Principles 4
‘It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world; yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the fore-mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations; and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?'
So the things we perceive with our senses are mind-dependent ideas that represent external material objects allowing us to perceive them (Locke’s Theory of Resemblance)
What is the syllogism for the argument for idealism which says that realism promotes scepticism and atheism?
P1. We perceive ordinary objects
P2. We perceive only ideas
C1. Therefore, ordinary objects are ideas
Explain the likeness principle
This is an attack on the resemblance thesis
In the same way that you can’t compare a smell with a texture, you can’t compare an idea with an object
An idea can only be like another idea - ‘I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea;a colour or figure can be nothing but another colour or figure’
Realists can’t assert a likeness between an idea and a material object
If material objects have colour, size, shape, number, texture etc and these are all ideas, how can we base knowledge of material objects solely on ideas
Realists claim that we only come to know of these ideas through material objects
So material objects are perceived first
But Berkey says realists must admit the possibility that ideas can exist without an external world
so realism → solipsism
Basically, their theory might be wrong so his might be right (baseless assumption)
Explain Berkeley’s master argument
Berkeley regarded this as his winning argument and the term master argument was first used in 1974
Here is asserts that the objects of perception cannot be mind-independent and must be ideas rather than material things
But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet,and nobody by to perceive them.I answer,you may so, there is no difficulty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees,and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose:it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy.
Essentially all knowledge is mind dependent
What is the syllogism for Berkeley’s master argument?
P1. We cannot think of a tree that is neither perceived nor conceived
P2. We can think of the idea of a tree, but not of a tree that exists independently of the mind
C1. So the tree doesn’t exist independently of the mind
Explain Lisa Downing’s criticisms of the master argument
Lisa Downing points out that Berkeley confuses a thought with what a thought is about
This can be presented as follows:
P1: My thoughts cannot exist outside my mind
C1: Therefore,according to Berkeley, my thought of a tree is mind-dependent. It is impossible that there can be a thought of a tree when no one is thinking of a tree.
P2: But a thought about a tree is not the same thing as an actual tree
C2: Whilst my thought of a tree is mind-dependent, it does not follow that the actual tree is also mind-dependent. It is not impossible to think that a tree may exist when no one is thinking of it.
Explain Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa’s criticism of the master argument
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa criticised Berkeley’s likeness principle for falling into the trap of ‘epistemic hyperbole’ (Berkeley also uses epistemic hyperbole in his argument for idealism)
Ichikawa’s implication is that Berkeley starts reasonably, by acknowledging the veil of perception which separates me from the objects of my sense experience. However, whilst this is a valid starting point, it seems that moving to a conclusion that nothing material actually exists is something of an exaggeration in Berkeley’s logic.
With regards to his likeness principle, suggesting that ‘an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be nothing but another colour or figure’ is an epistemic hyperbole as although an idea may not resemble a material object, it does not follow that it can be nothing like a material object
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